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Abstract
The Clinton Administration has initiated reforms in industrial relations to assure current and future
economic competitiveness.  Toward this goal, the Commission on the Future of Worker Management
Relations (the Dunlop Commission) was called to order. This paper draws from these transcripts on
workplace cooperation and explores the claims and policy assertions elaborated by each side.  I concluded
that insurmountable differences exist between capital and labor in their interpretation of cooperation.
Further, I contend that capital utilized the hearings to develop a hegemonic project whose final goal was
the exclusion of labor from future policy discussions.
Introduction
It is assumed by a number of scholars of industrial relations policy that the proliferation of
cooperative workplaces will contribute to the present and future economic competitiveness of the American
economy. Further, it is argued by proponents of increased worker-management cooperation that when
workers are allowed additional influence in organizational decision-making processes, this contributes to
the productivity of the employer. Eventually, a good portion of this windfall reaches the workers, which
will contribute to the alleviation of economic inequality in America.
 The Clinton administration has embraced and attempted to apply this philosophy.  Much of the
administration’s interest in tackling the task of reforming labor relations can be traced to Clinton’ s reading
of Bluestone and Bluestone’s text, Negotiating the Future, where, the authors argue, the nation’s present
and future economic interest will be secured when cooperative, less adversarial workplaces are encouraged
to develop over the traditional hierarchical, Tayloristic, system of work organization.  However, in a
subsequent and thought-provoking paper, Bluestone has warned that institutional reforms are necessary if
we are serious about advancing the cause of workplace cooperation. He suggested the reforms are
necessary to purge asymmetries from the cooperative context, thus facilitating and encouraging meaningful
dialogue between labor and management.  Bluestone envisioned the Dunlop hearings to be an excellent
opportunity to pursue the prerequisite reforms.1
Clinton’s inclusion of Robert Reich as Secretary of Labor, perhaps the lone cabinet member
within the administration to possess the credentials of a progressive policy advocate, can also be interpreted
to be additional evidence the administration was ready to embark on a path towards progressive labor
relations reforms.  Reich has devoted a good part of his career to the development and assertion of the
position that a key to the economic revitalization of the nation lies in the pursuit and implementation of
organizational and labor market reforms, which would contribute to the creation of more “flexible” work
systems.  In his memoirs, Reich confides that he chose to join the Clinton administration because he
believed Clinton to be motivated by a progressive, activist, policy orientation.  In this he recognized
perhaps his last, best chance to initiate his own brand of progressive policy reform2.
To this end, the administration has initiated the Commission on the Future of the Worker
Management Relations for the purpose of advancing towards these stated goals.  Referring to the work of
Bob Jessop, such effort might be visualized as an effort on the part of the State to construct hegemonic
projects.  To what degree this initiative will be successful depends to some extent upon the administration’s
ability, through the Dunlop Commission, to bring labor and capital together on some kind of agreement as
to what cooperation entails.  To pursue this question, we turn to an analysis of the proceedings of the
Dunlop hearings.
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The Managerial Perspective on Workplace Cooperation
Steven Darien of Merck Pharmaceuticals testifies that the current labor relations framework is not
conducive to the proliferation of cooperative workplaces.    Darien begins by noting his displeasure over a
number of recent NLRB rulings, which in his opinion have worked to discourage the proliferation of
cooperative workplaces.  Darien asserts that the effort to expand cooperative workplaces can be facilitated
only  “if the effort (to create cooperative workplaces) expands beyond the narrow confines of a single
program or process and if human resource practices such as compensation, training, employment systems,
and managerial reward systems are modified to support these efforts”.
Darien focused his critique on a number of recent rulings, which he asserted, represent examples
of recent overly conservative interpretations of cooperation.  These are NLRB opinions concerning the
Electromation, DuPont, Webcore, and Vons Grocery rulings.  Through these rulings, Darien observes that
the NLRB has sent out a message which has resonated through the managerial community, and this
message is that “employee involvement is permissible only as it has no impact on improving workplace
policies…. when employee involvement does become effective and the NLRB finds out about it, the board
is quick to strike it down.”
Speaking on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers, Rosemary Collyer extends the
critique further when she asserts that section 8 (a) (2) has served its purpose and is no longer worthy of
defense.  Besides, Collyer reminds the Commission, section nine of the NLRA allows individuals or groups
of employees the right at any time to present grievances to the employer and pursue an adjustment.  She
concludes by suggesting the failure to move towards more cooperative workplaces would have a
detrimental impact on the nation’s economy.  Continued progress toward this model should not be hindered
by concerns that this may lead to an infringement on the “employees’ exercise of free choice…freedom to
choose is the watchword, not representation per se” Collyer concludes.
An Assessment of Capital’s Position
 This is truly a dilemma.  If Darien’s point is correct, the likelihood of cooperative workplace
efforts to proliferate across the industrial landscape is doomed.   However, upon reviewing the 8 (a) (2)
cases referred to by Darien, such as the recent Electromation, and Du Pont rulings, concludes that this is not
true. For example, in Electromation, management unilaterally set up what they termed “action committees”.
These action committees were in response to increasing worker disgust regarding a number of recent policy
changes that impacted worker compensation rates.  Once the “action committees” were formed,
management decided the nature and scope of the topics to be discussed, which solutions or options were
feasible, and how many employees could participate on the committee.  Soon after the action committees
were up and running, a worker organization effort ensued.  The Teamsters union filed a suit against
Electromation, alleging that the action committees were operating in violation of sections 8 (a) (2) and 2 (5)
of the Wagner Act.  The NLRB sided with the Teamsters.  Who can blame the Teamsters?  With little
difficulty, one can begin to see how the action committee can work to obstruct worker progress towards
meaningful and independent representation before the employer.
Under the DuPont ruling, which concerns a union plant, management purposely set up a
cooperative program independent of the union.  From this, what occurred is that concessions the union
could not gain through negotiation with management were suddenly gained through the cooperative
program with ease.  After a series of victories were secured through the cooperative program, management
chided the workers for staying with their union after it seemed obvious that the cooperative effort was more
effective in winning concessions from management.  One example occurred when employees convinced
management to place picnic tables in the external break area.  This victory came after years of workers
attempting to achieve the same results through their labor union and the collective bargaining process3.
Clearly, in the example of the DuPont case, the cooperative program was being utilized primarily
to undermine worker support for the union.  This case demonstrates that the protection of 8 (a) (2) is
necessary to prevent employers from attempting to undermine already established unions.
Referring to the Webcore ruling in particular, Darien contends the cooperative program had to be
dismantled not because it was anti-union, but because “it committed the sin of establishing a plant council
in which hourly employees dealt employment-related issues.”  The cooperative programs at Webcore,
according to Darien, were operating beyond the scope of what is allowed by current labor law.  And in a
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sense, Darien is correct.  In their ruling on the case, the Board found that Mr. Sibilsky, the owner of
Webcore manufacturing, had unilaterally created and disbanded the participative structure.  Sibilsky
determined the structure and function of the program, as well as the topics deemed eligible for discussion.
Employees were allowed to elect representatives to meet with management in part as an effort to create and
perpetuate the illusion that the participatory program was bilateral.  The Board concluded that plant
management had ultimate authority over the program, and, further, no provisions were provided for its
existence independent of managerial fiat4.  Once again, an analysis of recent 8 (a) (2) cases leaves us with a
better understanding of management’s conception of workplace “cooperation”.
After reviewing the cases referred to by Darien, it seems the management contingent is protesting
the ability of the Board to strike down unilaterally directed cooperative programs.  What is revealing is the
fact that in these cases the Board was alerted of what was occurring by the workers themselves, further
indicating that the workers were not pleased with the form and the function of these unilateral cooperative
efforts.
Further evidence indicates that the Board is not indiscriminately disbanding cooperative programs,
as Darien would have us believe.  In his review of NLRB rulings against cooperative programs, research
conducted by James R. Rundle5 discovered that of the 58 participative programs disbanded by the NLRB
over a twenty-three year period extending from 1972 to 1993, only five were disbanded on the basis of an 8
(a) (2) violation alone.  All other cases involved at least one if not numerous unfair labor practices as a
precipitating factor leading to the disbanding of the cooperative programs.  This is further evidence that the
NLRB is not on a vendetta against cooperative programs.  On a more disturbing note, this indicates that the
employer for the purpose of undermining previously established worker rights occasionally utilizes
cooperative programs.
From Darien’s perspective, the perceived folly of Webcore can be corrected only through the
NLRB’s adoption of a more liberal interpretation and application of section 8 (a) (2) of the Wagner Act.
Darien suggests that 8(a) (2) should be revised in such a way to allow employers to “deal with” employees
in a non-union setting.   Returning to the Webcore ruling, the Board defines “dealing with” as entailing a
“bilateral mechanism involving proposals from the employee committee concerning subjects listed in 2
(5)”.   So, applying this to Darien and assuming he understands the concept of “dealing with” in the same
way the board does, the question is, what provisions would be present in Darien’s plan to assure the
creation of the necessary bilateral system?  None are offered.   Further, at no time throughout the hearings
did management appear receptive to the proposition that workers elect those workers who would represent
them via the cooperative program.  In fact, the managerial panelist seem to be hostile to the concept.
Is A Compromise Possible?
As a brief digression, the exchange between Douglas Fraser and the management panel elucidates
the point.  At the conclusion of the presentation of the management panelists, Fraser posits an open
question to any member of the panel willing to respond.   He asks whether the panel would be willing to
agree to a stipulation that employees be allowed to vote for representatives in the participative program if
the Commission was willing to endorse the liberalization of 8 (a) (2).   In response to his question, Fraser
encounters double talk.  Mary Harrington, Director of Human Relations at Eastman Kodak, argues that
since workers are put into their positions within the labor process on the basis of merit, rather than by
selection, it is difficult to understand why this same system should not be used to appoint employee
participants.  Harrington ads further that the logistics and topography of the manufacturing plant itself
make it difficult to embark on such a process: “…if you can picture a factory like ours where we have 20
square miles, several buildings and thousands of processes going on, to expect a few people elected to a
committee to try to understand that and try to make any meaningful contribution to safety doesn’t work.”
Besides, Darien ads, workers have the right to quit or to not participate in a cooperative program if
they are not satisfied with what is occurring.  The exit vs. voice dichotomy emerges from Darien’s
response.  And, this seems to be an underlying theme in the management presentation; they would rather
workers exercise the exit option than to create provisions which would encourage a working out of
differences.  Is this a good basis for labor policy?  This, I propose, is a distinguishing characteristic of the
unilateral system of “cooperation”.
Witnessing this exchange, Tom Kochan remarked that he agreed with a statement made by
Charles Nelson of Texas Instruments that a “window of opportunity” was quickly closing.  Kochan openly
wonders “how are we going to expand this process in a sensible way?”  Rosemary Collyer responds by
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asserting that there are a number of provisions in the NLRA that allow employees avenues to recourse
should they sense management has violated their rights.  Kochan seems to feel this is little consultation
when considering the broader anti-worker animus which may play a role in motivating employers toward
the acceptance of a cooperation model: “What do you do about the reality of the situation? We all get…
fliers from law firms and business consultants saying we’re putting on a seminar on how to stay union free,
and, by the way, the best way to remain union free is to establish an employee participation
program…Now, how do you separate out the motivation in that kind of situation where there may be a
multiple of motives going on, one of which is to avoid unionization?”
 Darien suggests that the more liberal interpretation of 8 (a) (2) must be reinforced by the creation
of stipulations which allow employees access to pertinent information and participation in selecting who
will represent them in the cooperative programs.  Additionally, steps must be taken to prevent employer
reprisals against employees.  Darien does not offer suggestions as to how these goals should be pursued or
enforced.  I would assume Darien would advocate some method of self-monitoring as a means to enforce
this goal.  Perhaps this is a strategy the panelists should have developed and pursued.  This strategy might
have a chance, especially since the administration’s “reinventing government” initiative does place a great
emphasis on corporate self monitoring while allowing workers the tools, not necessarily through unions, to
monitor the monitors.
Capital Endorses the Passage of the TEAM Act
Darien concludes that if the NLRB continues to interpret section 8 (a) (2) in its current stringent
manner then “we do not see this as a viable alternative.”   As part of the effort to reform 8 (a) (2), Darien
and his sponsor, the Labor Policy Association, have strenuously endorsed the passage of the TEAM Act.
Essentially, the TEAM Act would abolish section 8 (a) (5) of the Wagner Act, thus allowing management
the freedom to create, direct, and support the cooperative effort.  Management would be allowed to
determine the array and scope of topics to be discussed within the context of the cooperative context.
Management could freely select or reject solutions to issues bought up to the forum for consideration.
Rundle and Greenfield point out that the TEAM Act would go so far as to allow management to choose the
workers who would in turn represent their fellow workers6.  It should then come as no surprise that
Darien’s testimony would lead to this.  Both the Democratic Party and Chairman of the NLRB, William J.
Gould IV, have not totally dismissed the possibility of the enactment of a modified TEAM Act bill.  Gould,
in particular, has suggested that if provisions are included in the bill that would allow the workers a free
and autonomous choice of participants representing them in the cooperative program, the bill would then be
purged of its disagreeable aspects, thus making it easier for critics to support.   However, the business
community has proven unwilling to compromise.  The Republican Party, as well as the Labor Policy
Association, has responded to this proposition by labeling it to be blatantly “pro-labor” and therefore
unacceptable7.   This reveals, once again, an ulterior motive behind management’s apparent willingness to
cooperate with labor.
Darien asserts his belief that the government cannot force workers and managers to cooperate.  In
addition, an overarching definition of cooperation would not be productive because each work situation
must be allowed the freedom to tailor the cooperative system to its particular needs.  Instead, the role of
government should be relegated “to provide(ing) the soil in which the seeds of cooperative relationships
can sprout and to provide nutrients and the conditions in which the plant can flourish”.  From Darien’s
perspective, a role for organized labor does not exist in the cooperative workplace.  Unions only disrupt the
potential for harmony that exists between employers and workers: “...tensions between employees and
employers are often exacerbated by the presence of the union.”  Darien summarizes.  The review of the
recent 8 (a) (2) cases indicates these tensions may actually be exacerbated with the imposition of unilateral
cooperative programs.  Perhaps to Darien, industrial peace occurs when managerial control of the
workplace is in no way questioned or challenged.  Is this the basis of good labor policy?
Capital Elaborates the Nuances of a Functioning Cooperative Program
From the perspective of business, what would the cooperative programs look like?  What would
the role of the employee look like?  Dan Rainville offers testimony that sheds light on this.  Rainville states
that the cooperative program at his firm, Universal Dynamics, has received numerous awards and
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accolades.  He states that, currently, the program is not in operation, but “the structure is still there if
something comes up”.  Rainville does not indicate why the program was discontinued or what event would
trigger its resurrection.  Rainville notes that when he initially arrived at Universal Dynamics, worker-
management strife was rampant.  Perhaps this gives clue as to why the program was initiated to begin with.
Rainville points out that perhaps the largest impediment to be overcome was the workforce’s aversion to
change.  He does not specify as to whether any specific group within the organization resisted the
transition.  Rainville also points out that employees need to be properly “educated” to assure their optimal
contribution to the program.  Some idea of what this education might entail is to be found in Rainville’s
discussion of the process.  “In the past, we had a philosophy that people couldn’t understand things like
profits, especially since they (profits) were more than maybe their annual salary in maybe a month, and we
found that once we disclosed all the information instead of selecting the information that we disclosed or
didn’t disclose we built trust”.
 Part of this education also includes an introduction to trickle-down economics, where employees
are informed that firm survivability and profitability are perquisite to the workers receiving a paycheck;
“we have to pay our shareholders” Rainville reminds his workers, as well as the Commission.  “You may
be surprised at that but our people understand that our shareholders are investors in our company and that
they are entitled a return on their investment and that we are here because they are investing in us…every
decision I make is based on improving the quality of their lives.”   Confusion remains as to whether he is
referring to the lives of the shareholders or of the workers.  “When I go to the company picnic and look at
the families I realize I have a tremendous responsibility towards them.”
Rainville appears to be elaborating upon a problem identified by Edward Lawler and Susan
Mohrman8.  Lawler and Mohrman argue that cooperative programs quickly encounter and surpass a
“honeymoon” stage of development, primarily, because employees, and sometimes management, possess
unrealistic expectations of what the cooperative program will do for them.  As a result, the program tends
to fade prematurely.  Lawler and Mohrman observe that to avoid this situation, and preferably before the
cooperative system is fully implemented, workers need to be informed by management of the limitations of
the program.  Boundaries need to be established that indicate clearly to the employees what can and cannot
be expected from the cooperative effort.   Although Lawler and Mohrman offer some important
observations, this, like Rainville’s information delivery system, seems to operate in a top down fashion.
Neither of these scenarios offers indication that the expectations and the limitation of the system should be
decided in a collaborative manner.
From this point Rainville focuses on Universal Dynamic’s “empowerment” program, which is
apparently the backbone of the cooperative effort.  First, the empowerment program consisted of a steering
committee, which was composed of representative from both the employer as well as the employees.
Rainville does not go into any detail of what this employee “empowerment” process entails.  However, this
is potentially problematic because “power”- if it can still be called that - is something granted to the
employee by the employer.  Is this a good foundation on which to build labor policy?
Labor’s Interpretation of Workplace Cooperation
Charles Silberman, legal counsel of the AFL-CIO, begins by distinguishing between two forms of
cooperative programs that can be pursued and developed.  The first is unilateral in nature.  Under
unilaterally directed cooperation, or participative management, some authority is granted to the workers by
management for the purpose of participating in the cooperative system.  Under participative management,
management decides which workers will be selected to participate and what topics will be discussed within
the parameters of the cooperative system, and management determines the rules, regulations, and
procedures of the cooperative system.
The second model is bilateral in application.  A truly democratic process emerges because both
sides, labor and management, are encouraged to participate as equals in creating and perpetuating the
cooperative system.  Issues are resolved on a consensual basis.  Workers are free to choose their own
representatives.  These refinements are likely to establish and institutionalize themselves only in a work
environment where the collective bargaining apparatus and the obligations associated with it is present.
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A Distinction between Unilateral and Bilateral Cooperation is Made
Citing Freedman and Medoff’s text, What Do Unions Do?,  Silberman argues that worker
organization is essential to successful cooperative efforts because, once the cooperative effort becomes
institutionalized, the relationship between workers and managers changes from “that of a casual dating
game in which people look elsewhere at the first serious problem permanent marriage in which they resolve
disputes through discussion and negotiation.”   Citing the work of William C. Cooke, Silberman argues that
union-based participation programs are more productive than non-union participative programs.  “A union
which is favorable to employee involvement and works effectively to produce the conditions which
supports employee involvement can indeed contribute to a successful effort …the key determinants are
conditions which unions help to create.”   Sixty years ago, Silberman reminds the panel, congress
recognized the value of encouraging workers to organize and collectively bargain with the employer.
Today, litigation increases as the percentage of workers organized in union’s declines.  Silberman suggests
the fact that these events are correlated is not coincidental.  If the employers are truly interested in keeping
the government out of the workplace, then why are they not more supportive of collective bargaining,
which actually discourages government involvement?  This is an interesting observation.
The Labor Panelists Defend the Wagner Act
Like the managerial panelists before, Silberman grapples with the 8 (a) (2) issue.  The future of 8
(a) (2) seems to be a matter of crucial importance to the issue at hand from the perspective of both labor
and management.  Silberman contends that 8 (a) (2) is of really of little significance in the context of the
present discussion.  Silberman argues this is so because the Wagner Act permits the creation and
proliferation of cooperative programs so long as they are concerned with issues of workplace productivity
and efficiency rather than with the terms and conditions of employment.  Recalling the earlier testimony of
Edward Miller, a former NLRB board member appointed under the Bush administration, Silberman asserts
that the cooperative/participative programs are well within the parameters of 8 (a) (2), and, most certainly,
if 8(a) (2) were rolled back, employers would take advantage of this by introducing company unions into
the workplace.  Silberman’s observations coincide with conclusions derived at the end result of 8 (a) (2)
cases that occurred earlier in this paper.  Silberman points out that the Wagner Act is not detrimental to
genuine cooperative efforts so long as the cooperative effort does not extend into negotiations covering the
conditions of employment.  Further, Silberman is concerned that the abolition of 8 (a) (2) would deter the
proliferation of autonomous worker organization efforts.
Power Asymmetries Must Be Removed to Assure an Optimal Cooperative Effort
Next, labor develops the position that cooperative efforts, which are established in workplaces
where acute power asymmetries exist, are actually self-defeating.   They are self-defeating because
management is allowed to freely dominate workplace culture.  This smothers and eventually undermines
the capacity for the autonomous development of worker culture and, the argument continues, a kind of
cultural perversion results where workers are turned against each other in the name of “self monitoring”.  A
culture of animosity and paranoia then sets in, making it difficult for the workers to make meaningful and
substantial contributions to the betterment of the work situation.
Richard Bensinger, who was at the time the AFL-CIO’s chief organizer, develops this argument.
He notes that this situation is exacerbated by the employers’ penchant to resist worker organization efforts,
even to such an extent that illegal methods are utilized towards this end.  The manipulation of employee
culture is also a means toward this end.  Bensinger argues that trendy terms like "total quality management"
and "quality of work life" and similar programs are no more than exercises in “psycho-babble” that are
intended to obfuscate management’s true desire to establish non-union and anti-union workplaces.
To support his assertion, Bensinger recalls his own personal experiences as a supervisor trainee in
the southwest.  Bensinger and his colleagues were encouraged by the HR staff to take steps to make the
employees feel they are empowered to give them the impression that management was listening to them
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and that management was ready to act on their concerns.  To supplement this effort, teams were created.
Bensinger reports that the leaders were chosen not only on the basis of their ability to lead the workers in
the way that management desired but also on the basis of their anti-union sentiment.
Later, in a facility where Bensinger was attempting to organize the workforce in the early eighties,
it became clear to Bensinger that cooperative programs were being utilized to undermine a worker
organization drive: “With Orwelian deliberance, managers became facilitators, discipline became enforced
by a team of peers and an atmosphere of peer pressure was being used to maintain total control of the
workforce.”  Bensinger’s description of what occurs within a cooperative system varies considerably from
that depicted by the managerial contingent.  Bensinger seems to be questioning managerial motives behind
the implementation of cooperative workplaces.  Evoking Guillermo J. Graneir’s text, Inhuman Relations,
Bensinger asserts that his experiences and those of the author coincide, therefore suggesting these are in all
likelihood not isolated and disconnected events.  Bensinger concludes the discussion of these events by
noting that labor law, as it is currently interpreted, allows employers to embark on these and similar
programs with impunity, and often times, these efforts are directed towards the discouragement of worker
organization activity: “Under current law, any employer who expends maximum and not even so maximum
efforts to defeat a union campaign can win any time, anywhere, without breaking the law, with maximum
force and aggressiveness.”
Bensinger concludes by asking, with these asymmetries in place, how can productive cooperative
efforts be attempted?  Cooperative efforts will not work, he continues, until considerable effort is devoted
to restoring the dignity of the worker.  From his own experience, Bensinger concludes that employers are
not willing to accept the prerogative of the workers to organize.  Labor law reforms are needed to create the
balance deemed necessary to encourage healthy, bilateral, cooperative efforts.
Discussion
Clearly, management’s interpretation of cooperation is one sided.  It seems that
Management would like to use the cooperation issue to gain greater control over the workplace.  First, it
has been adequately demonstrated that management’s claim that labor laws, as they have been recently
interpreted, prevent the creation of cooperative ventures is a red herring.  This is further reinforced by an
analysis of the transcripts of the TEAM Act hearings conducted by Rundle and Greenfield.  Basically, the
purpose of the TEAM Act was to liberalize section 8 (a) (2) to allow employers the ability to “deal” with
employees even when a union is not present.  Rundle and Greenfield found that, in the course of the Senate
hearings regarding the bill, many of the managerial personnel offering testimony had actually contradicted
themselves when they stated they already had cooperative programs in place, and were reportedly quite
satisfied with them.9  If this is the case then, why the sudden desire to liberalize 8 (a)(2)?
This leads one to believe that management doesn’t really want cooperation with labor per se.  It
seems that what is really desired is the unbridled ability to unilaterally define the definition of cooperation,
and the circumstances under which cooperation takes place.  In addition, a clear anti-worker animus
emerges in the panelists condemnation of 8 (a) (2) and all that it stands for.
This represents an affront to the spirit of the Wagner Act.  The Wagner Act was created, in part, as
an effort to level asymmetries that exist between employee and employer and to facilitate meaningful
cooperation between the two parties.  More importantly, the Wagner Act was the first boa fide attempt
since the time of Wilson’s ill-fated industrial relations board to create a system of national labor policy10.
Although these were worthy goals, it is understood that the stabilization of the capitalist economic system
was clearly its primary goal11.
Dan Rainville’s description of the cooperative program further indicates management’s desire to
control or manipulate the cooperative process.  This much is indicated when Rainville indicates that
Universal Dynamics unilaterally set up and disassembled the cooperative program.  As noted earlier we are
given no clue as to what motivates these actions.  Further, the discussion of the “education” process is
troubling because this presents an opportunity for management to manipulate worker culture to the
employer’s advantage.  For example, according to Rainville’s testimony, the education program is clearly
utilized for the purpose of introducing workers to a corporate perspective of economics and business
obligations.  According to Fones-Wolfe’s study of corporate welfare practices, the education of the worker
has from an early stage been identified as an essential ingredient to the creation of a docile and compliant
workforce12.  Many of these practices were pioneered and refined by the National Association of
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Manufacturers, of which Rainville is a member. Do opportunities exist for the workers to be exposed to
alternative viewpoints?
What results is anti-policy.  Participative programs, according to management’s interpretation,
should not be commonly defined.  Instead, from management’s perspective, they are to be interpreted and
applied on an arbitrary, case-by-case basis and not guided by an overarching goal, logic or direction.  In a
sense, this coincides with the current social context’s rejection of institution building as a solution to issues
of national concern.  This coincides with the conclusion forwarded by James A. Gross.  Gross has observed
that throughout the post-war era, we have witnessed a continuing disintegration of labor policy13.  What has
occurred here represents a continuation of the trend.  Some have argued further that the lack of a coherent
and productive labor policy has contributed to our increasing inability to economically compete with other
advanced industrialized nations while detracting from the standard of living of the nation’s workers14.
From this perspective, it seems that prerogatives offered by management would only contribute to the
exacerbation of the current situation.
Essentially, labor has taken this opportunity to develop the position that the New Deal labor
relations institutions are worthy of defense and extension.  The labor panelists extended and reinforced this
position by arguing that the weakening of this edifice would likely lead to the proliferation of unilaterally
imposed cooperative programs which, in the end, would prove counterproductive to the stated purpose of
the cooperative effort.  Within the last couple of decades, an increasing volume of literature from the
flexibility perspective has effectively challenged the new Deal edifice15.  The flexibility theorists contend
that rigidities within the New Deal system are detrimental to the industrial competitiveness of the nation.
Unfortunately, as the hearings have revealed, it is apparent that, for all its work, proponents of the
flexibility perspective have yet to offer a coherent vision of what the post New Deal system of labor
relations would entail.  In fact, after analyzing the corpus of the flexibility literature one is left with the
conclusion that the true purpose of this literature is to advance the cause of “organizational learning” rather
than workplace cooperation.  This conclusion is only reinforced as a result of the analysis of the testimony
of the managerial contingent, which are, and always have been, the audience to which the flexibility
message is most directed.16
Implications to Labor Policy: The Building of Hegemonic Projects
The proceedings of the Future of Worker-Management Relations can be envisaged as an attempt
by the state to develop what Jessop refers to as a “hegemonic project.” 17  The purpose of the hegemonic
project is to nullify class conflict either between factions within capital or between capital and labor.  This
is done in such a way that capitalist domination of the economic system is maintained and preferably, from
the perspective of capital, reinforced.  The need to revise or rebuild hegemonic projects is linked to the
contradictory nature of the capitalist economic system.  Thus, over time, systems of accumulation lose their
ability to maintain labor peace and capitalist profitability simultaneously.
Towards this end, programs or policy options are introduced into the political sphere for the
purpose of re-imposing stability.  The programs are portrayed as beneficial to the national interest.  Thus,
the goals of the hegemonic project must be articulated in such a fashion that they encompass the goals and
interests of all potential, significant participants.  Incentives and rewards are offered as part of the effort to
enlist these interests into the project.
 However, this does not mean that participating factions cannot attempt to co-opt the process and
turn it to their advantage.  For example, capitalists attempted to sell its version of increased cooperation to
the state by promising future increased economic productivity and viability.  Nothing was offered to labor
in return for their cooperation.  This, in part, explains the inability to reach a compromise.  Further, this
indicates that capital has not yet abandoned the post-World War II project, which commenced with the
creation and the eventual initiation of Taft-Hartley, of pushing organized labor completely out of the labor
relations arena, thus successfully defending, and expanding, its so-called “right to manage” 18.  Perhaps if
the republican “revolution” had not lost its momentum or if the advocate had taken advantage of William J.
Gould and the “New Democrats’” offer to revise the TEAM Act in such a way that workers would be
allowed the freedom to elect team participants, the outcome might have been much different indeed19.
So, at least for the time being, labor has by default preserved the National Labor Relations Act.
The question remaining for labor is, is the Wagner Act worthy of defense and possible expansion, or has it
become an iron cage which has, either inadvertently or by design, detracted from the full potential of the
promise of worker organization?  If the latter is concluded, should defense of Wagner be jettisoned for a
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new strategy?  What should this new strategy be?  The Dunlop hearings indicate that labor is faced with an
uphill battle regardless of how this question is answered.
Under the conditions created by a positive class compromise, all parties benefit.20   Workers play a
(larger) role in influencing the nature of the production process.  In addition, labor gains a position to better
negotiate a larger return for its productive efforts.  In exchange, capital is promised a more compliant
workforce.  Wage increases assure future increased consumer activity.  However, one consequence of the
positive class compromise is the increased strength of labor to levels that are defined to be intolerable to
capital.  Capitalists are likely to shun cooperation with labor for fear that this will threaten its ability to
exercise the prerogative of private property ownership.  To compensate for this risk, capital will likely
avoid a positive class compromise unless the cooperation of labor is deemed necessary to assist in solving a
production problem it cannot otherwise solve alone.
This implies that a delicate balance exists between the balance of institutional power and the
propensity to cooperate.  And, this is with little doubt historically conditioned.  For example, in the present
situation, the elaboration of the global economy detracts from the likelihood that labor will be seen as a
potential partner for solving production problems.   Ironically, the Clinton administration’s belief in “free
markets” and subsequent activities to nurse this vision to fruition, such as the passage of the NAFTA trade
bill, have likely done little to advance the goal of workplace cooperation.  Unfortunately, Reich (1991),
among others, consistently fails to visualize a connection between these events and workplace cooperation.
In a sense, capital has attempted to exploit this advantage through its advocacy of the TEAM Act.
Theoretically, if passed, the TEAM Act would certainly have narrowed the institutional
parameters of worker power, thus making future, meaningful discussions of workplace cooperation nearly
impossible.  Institutional frameworks must be developed to encourage the development of a situation
leading to the positive class compromise.  The current context, with its emphasis on ending the so-called
era of “big government” and “empowering” people as “individuals”, will certainly carry us further from
this stated goal.
In conclusion, the Dunlop hearings resulted in little more than a “negative class compromise.”  By
this it is maintained that within the context of the hearings both sides have attempt to either maintain their
turf, as labor had through its defense of the New Deal edifice, or to attempt to extend their institutional
domination over the opponent, as capital had attempted to do through its continued pushing of a free
market ideology.  At this point in time, neither side possesses sufficient social power or momentum to
overwhelm the opponent.   Little if anything positive emerges from a negative compromise situation and,
subsequently, much remains to be accomplished.
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